On Monday, November 16, an attacker slipped malicious code into the customer projects of the Optimizely platform, and it ran on the websites of 178 organizations, from hardware wallet maker Ledger to the BBC, CNN, IKEA and the bank HSBC. The script swapped crypto wallet addresses and collected card data. The loss is small so far, but the mechanics deserve a closer look.
What exactly happened?
Optimizely sells tools that companies use to test different versions of a website. A client adds one line of code to a page, and everything else, from a button color to banner text, loads from Optimizely's servers. Convenient, as long as the vendor's server is clean.
Researcher Amirul Iman dubbed the campaign Optimjack. According to Report URI, the victims also include OANDA, Coinpass, IG, Interactive Investor, TMS Brokers, Zoom, GitLab and Salesforce. Together these sites draw millions of visitors every day.
According to the company, an unknown party exploited a flaw in the account signup flow of its Experimentation product and wrote its own JavaScript into some customer projects. Nobody broke into the sites themselves. They trusted a vendor's script and ran it as their own. Researchers at Report URI saw the first cases at 4:21 UTC on the BBC site, and by 21:52 the same day only one snippet still carried the malicious code.
How did the malicious script work?
Researchers describe four actions, and only the first two are about crypto.
- Address swapping: the code scanned pages for valid addresses on the Bitcoin, Ethereum, Tron, Solana and TON networks and replaced them with the attacker's own.
- It did the same with the address in the clipboard. A user copied one address and could paste another.
- The script watched for card numbers, expiry dates and security codes typed into ordinary forms on the sites. Payment provider fields in separate frames, like Stripe's, it could not read.
- On iPhones and iPads the code tried to load the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits, which hit older versions of iOS.
The clipboard swap is nasty because nobody reads a wallet address to the end. A person copies it, pastes it into an app and confirms the transfer, and the difference in a long string of characters is almost invisible.
Why does this work even on big sites? Because a browser cannot tell which code belongs to the page and which belongs to someone else. Any included script gets the same rights: it sees everything on screen and reads everything a user types into ordinary fields. For an attacker it is the cheapest way to land on hundreds of addresses at once.
How much did they manage to steal?
The sums are modest. The attacker's addresses received roughly $7,150, mostly in Bitcoin, Litecoin and USDT. Early on Tuesday the attacker emptied everything. One Tron address used to cash out had already appeared in operations in March and on November 3, so Report URI linked this attack to the earlier ones.
Estimates differ. StepSecurity counted roughly $6,600 across the wallets, noting that some addresses were active before the attack. Alex Thorn of Galaxy Digital went further, and in his view victims sent only about $2,300, and most of the Bitcoin receipts look like the attacker's own money routed through an exchange back to their wallets. That is done to make the chain look busier.
How many cards were stolen, how many cookies reached the attacker's server and how many devices were infected, the researchers cannot see. So these figures are only the part visible on the blockchain.
What should visitors of these sites do?
Scott Helme, founder of Report URI, advises anyone who visited the affected sites on November 16 to check any crypto transfers from that day, update their iPhones and iPads and watch their card statements. Site owners, he says, should review custom code in their Optimizely projects and rotate credentials.
We at Kurslog would add one more habit. After pasting an address, compare the first and last few characters with what the source shows, not with the site you are standing on. It takes ten seconds. And for a large sum, send a test transfer first.
A word on hardware wallets. They show the recipient address on their own screen, and a browser cannot change it. If the address on the device does not match the one you meant to paste, cancel the transfer. That is the one step a swap on the page cannot get around.
What comes next?
Optimizely still has not explained how the attacker reached other customers' projects, and for now that is the main open question. The company says it closed the vulnerable path, ended active sessions, revoked tokens and blocked code delivery through Cloudflare. Salesforce said it disabled Optimizely scripts on its sites while the review continues.
This is not a one-off. In October, government agencies and other organizations took websites offline over critical PHP vulnerabilities, and on October 29 Polymarket paused trading after a third-party provider was compromised. The pattern repeats: the weak spot is not the platform itself but the vendor it trusts.
The takeaway for the market is down to earth. One third-party script opens the door to hundreds of sites at once, and the site itself does not control it. This time the thief took about $7,150, and the scheme will work anywhere there is someone else's code and crypto.




Comments
Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *